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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WEST VALLEY CITY, 
A p p e l l a n t , 
v s . 
KENT R. FULLMER, 
A p p e l l e e . 
A p p e l l a t e No. 950793-CA 
P r i o r i t y No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Because this case is an appeal from the final judgment of the 
Third Circuit Court, the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Did the trial judge correctly dismiss the charge 
against Appellee by holding that as a matter of law, Section 76-10-
504 of the Utah Code requires that a concealed dangerous weapon 
must be carried in a moving vehicle? (See Transcript of Verdict, 
West Valley City v. Fullmer, at 1-4.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's interpretation of 
statutes is a question of law that is reviewed under a correction 
of error standard. State v. Larsen, 865 P. 2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 
1993); State v. Shipler, 869 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah App. 1994). "This 
court review[s] questions of law under a correction of error 
1 
standard, without deference to the trial court." Shipler, 869 P. 2d 
at 969 (citation omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
This appeal does not involve an interpretation of any 
provision from the federal or Utah Constitutions. 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 
These sections are included in the Addendum to this Brief. 
RULES 
No procedural rules are at issue in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal concerns the trial judge's dismissal of the charge 
against Appellee by ruling that Section 76-10-504 of the Utah Code 
requires that a concealed dangerous weapon be physically moved in 
order for it to be "carried." This interpretation of Section 76-
10-504 contradicts the plain language of the statute and the case 
law that has interpreted it. A copy of the trial judge's ruling is 
included in the Addendum to this Brief. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
These facts were introduced at trial, but the only discussion 
of the trial judge's interpretation of Section 76-10-504 was in his 
final verdict. Since this appeal concerns the trial judge's final 
ruling and not the evidence, only that final ruling was 
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transcribed. These facts are presented here for background 
purposes. 
Early in the morning of May 8, 1995, officers from the West 
Valley City Police Department responded to a call reporting a 
suspicious person in the parking lot of an apartment complex. The 
police officers arrived and discovered Appellee, Kent R. Fullmer, 
("Fullmer") inside the passenger compartment of a vehicle. The 
officers approached and requested identification from Fullmer, 
which he provided. 
The officers conducted a routine check for outstanding 
warrants, which revealed that there were outstanding warrants for 
Fullmer. Upon learning this, the officers took Fullmer into 
custody. The officers also searched Fullmer's vehicle as part of 
the lawful arrest. The officers discovered a Davis .380 caliber 
handgun under the arm rest between the two front seats. The gun 
contained a full clip of bullets, although there was not a bullet 
in the chamber. Another full clip was found next to the gun. Both 
clips contained five rounds. 
Fullmer was charged with violating Section 76-10-504 of the 
Utah Code, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon. At a bench trial 
held on October 16, 1995, the trial judge dismissed the charge. He 
held that the term "carrying" in the statute required that the 
weapon be physically moved. Under that interpretation of 
Section 76-10-504, the trial judge held that as a matter of law the 
crime had not been committed. (Transcript of Verdict, West Valley 
City v. Fullmer, at p. 3, In. 11-14) . 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY DISMISSED THE 
CHARGE AGAINST FULLMER BECAUSE HIS 
INTERPRETATION THAT SECTION 76-10-504 REQUIRES 
THAT A WEAPON BE PHYSICALLY MOVED IN A VEHICLE 
IN ORDER TO BE "CARRIED" CONTRADICTS THE 
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE AND CASES THAT HAVE 
INTERPRETED THE STATUTE. 
The trial judge's dismissal of the charges against Fullmer 
contradicts the language of the Utah Code and Utah case law. The 
Utah Code does not require physical movement of a concealed weapon, 
only that it be "readily accessible for immediate use." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-501 (2) (a) (Supp. 1995). A weapon is readily 
accessible for immediate use if it "is carried on the person or 
within such close proximity and in such a manner that it can be 
retrieved and used as readily as if carried on the person." Id. 
§ 76-10-501 (2) (0 . Nothing in this language requires movement or 
implies that movement is necessary. In fact, a weapon could be 
secreted in non-moving vehicle, and still be "carried," if a person 
has control over the weapon and is close enough that the weapon 
could be easily retrieved. Thus, the Utah Code does not require 
that a weapon must be physically moved in order for it to be 
"carried." 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has clarified the meaning 
of the term "carried." In State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092 (Utah 
1981) , the court held that the term "carry" means having the weapon 
under control and within immediate, easy, or ready access. 
Williams, 636 P. 2d at 1094. In Williams, a handgun was secreted on 
the front seat of a vehicle, much like the present case. Whether 
4 
the vehicle had moved or not made no difference to the court's 
analysis. In fact, the court specifically agreed that its 
interpretation extended to weapons concealed within vehicles, 
whether or not the vehicle moved. Williams, 636 P. 2d at 1095. In 
similar fashion, the charges against Fullmer should not have been 
dismissed simply because his vehicle did not move. 
The trial judge's interpretation of Section 76-10-504 was 
incorrect. The ruling has no basis in the statute and directly 
contradicts Utah case law. Carrying a concealed dangerous weapon 
is criminal conduct because of the danger that is posed to the 
public, not because of the transportability of the weapon in a 
vehicle or on a person's clothing. Carrying is not determined by 
movement, but by accessibility. The trial judge improperly 
dismissed the charge simply because the vehicle had not moved. The 
trial judge's ruling should therefore be set aside and this case 
retried. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY DISMISSED THE 
CHARGE AGAINST FULLMER BECAUSE HIS 
INTERPRETATION THAT SECTION 76-10-504 REQUIRES 
THAT A WEAPON BE PHYSICALLY MOVED IN A VEHICLE 
IN ORDER TO BE "CARRIED" CONTRADICTS THE 
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE AND CASES THAT HAVE 
INTERPRETED THE STATUTE. 
The trial judge improperly dismissed the charge against 
Fullmer because his interpretation of Section 76-10-504 contradicts 
the plain language of the statute and case law that has interpreted 
it. Nothing in the statute or in cases interpreting the statute 
requires that a weapon be physically moved in order to be 
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ucarried." Since the trial judge based his decision to dismiss the 
charge on this erroneous interpretation of Section 76-10-504, the 
decision should be set aside, and the case retried. 
The trial judge's interpretation of Section 76-10-504 is not 
supported by the plain language of the statute. Nothing in the 
language of Sections 76-10-501 to -504, which deal with carrying a 
concealed dangerous weapon, requires that a concealed dangerous 
weapon be physically moved in order to be "carried." Although the 
statute does not define the term "carry," it does define a 
concealed dangerous weapon as one uthat is covered, hidden, or 
secreted . . . and is readily accessible for immediate use." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-501(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1995). uxReadily accessible 
for immediate use' means that a . . . weapon is carried on the 
person or within such close proximity and in such a manner that it 
can be retrieved and used as readily as if carried on the person." 
Id. § 76-10-501(2) (0 . Thus, if a weapon is hidden but still easily 
retrievable, it may be a concealed dangerous weapon, regardless of 
whether it physically moves or not. 
For example, a handgun could be brought to a vehicle parked on 
a street, where it could be hidden where it is readily accessible 
for immediate use by a person seated inside. According to the 
statute, a concealed dangerous weapon is one that is carried on the 
person, or is within such close proximity that it can be retrieved 
and used as readily as if carried on the person. Even though the 
vehicle does not physically move, the handgun would be a concealed 
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dangerous weapon. Physical movement of the weapon is not a 
requirement of ''carrying." 
The trial judge's ruling also contradicts the interpretation 
given to the statute by the Utah Supreme Court. The court 
clarified the meaning of the term "carry" in State v. Williams, 636 
P.2d 1092 (Utah 1981). In that case, police officers pulled the 
defendant over for a traffic violation, and did a routine check for 
outstanding warrants. Because the defendant had outstanding 
warrants, he was placed under arrest and his car impounded. The 
officers discovered a handgun in a satchel that was placed on the 
front seat of the vehicle, easily accessible to defendant. The 
defendant was charged with carrying a concealed dangerous weapon 
under the predecessor statute to Secton 76-10-504.1 Id. 636 P.2d 
at 1093-94. 
On appeal, the defendant argued that he was not "carrying" the 
weapon on his person, and should not have been convicted of 
carrying a concealed dangerous weapon. The trial judge had 
instructed the jury that the weapon only needed to be accessible, 
but not necessarily on the person of the defendant. The defendant 
had requested an instruction that limited the offense to weapons 
actually carried on person of the offender. Id. , 636 P.2d at 1094. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's 
interpretation of the statute, and held that a person is carrying 
1
 The Utah Legislature has changed Section 76-10-504 twice 
since 1981. The statute was reworded in 1982 and 1995. However, 
the language at issue has remained unchanged since Williams was 
decided. See 1995 Utah Laws ch. 80, § 2; 1982 Utah Laws ch. 17, 
§ 1. 
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a weapon when the weapon is in the person's control and within 
immediate, easy, or ready access. The court focused on the purpose 
of Section 76-10-504: 
Clearly, the purpose of concealed weapons statutes is to 
protect the public by preventing an individual from 
having on hand a weapon of which the public is unaware 
and which the individual might use should he be so in 
inclined. . . . As a factual matter, where the concealed 
weapon is shown to be under defendant's control and 
within his immediate, easy or ready access, he will be 
deemed to be "carrying" the weapon. 
Williams, 636 P. 2d at 1094. Whether the vehicle moved or not made 
no difference to the court's analysis. A weapon may be under a 
person's control and within his or her immediate access without 
being moved in a vehicle. In fact, the court specifically agreed 
that its interpretation applied to weapons hidden in vehicles 
within easy reach of a person. Id., 636 P.2d at 1095. According 
to the court, accessibility is the determining factor, not 
mobility. Therefore, an individual is "carrying" a weapon when 
that weapon is secreted in an automobile within the immediate, 
easy, or ready access of the person. Whether the automobile moves 
or not is immaterial. 
The charge against Fullmer should not have been dismissed 
because this case is nearly identical factually to State v. 
Williams. The only significant difference between the present case 
and Williams is that the vehicle in Williams moved while it 
contained a hidden handgun, and in the present case the vehicle had 
not moved. The other facts are nearly the same. Fullmer was first 
approached by officers investigating a complaint, and Williams was 
pulled over in a routine traffic stop. Both Fullmer and Williams 
8 
were taken into custody because a routine check revealed 
outstanding warrants. Both vehicles were searched because of the 
lawful arrests. A handgun was discovered in both vehicles. 
Williams was found to have carried a concealed dangerous weapon, 
and so should Fullmer. Whether the vehicle moved or not is 
irrelevant. Because his interpretation of Section 76-10-504 
contradicts the Utah Supreme Court, the trial judge improperly 
dismissed the charge against Fullmer, and that decision should be 
set aside. 
The trial judge discussed Williams when he announced his final 
decision. He held that Williams did not apply to this case because 
the car was not moving. 
State v. Williams, though [dealt with] a vehicle that's 
moving as opposed to one that's stationary. If [Ful-
lmer' s vehicle] had been moving, clearly carrying extends 
to a vehicle that's moving; but if it's not moving, then 
it's not any different than placing it in a room some 
place. 
In this case, the vehicle wasn't moving and had not been 
moving with the weapon in that location, so I'm going to 
find that it doesn't meet the definition as carried. 
(Transcript of Verdict, West Valley City v. Fullmer, at p. 3, In. 
2-14) . As has been discussed, this interpretation has no basis in 
the statute or in case law. 
The judge's ruling impermissibly creates a loophole in 
Section 76-10-504: A person is not carrying a concealed dangerous 
weapon if he or she can show that the weapon did not move. The 
legislature criminalized this conduct because of the severe threat 
to public safety caused by concealed weapons. See Williams, 636 
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P.2d at 1094-95. The threat is equally severe whether the weapons 
are located in moving or non-moving vehicles. If the legislature 
had intended to excuse weapons that are not actually moved while 
concealed, the legislature would have done so. Instead, the 
offense is defined in terms of accessibility, whether the weapon 
has been moved or not. 
The trial judge held that a vehicle must move with the weapon 
before the weapon will be deemed to be "carried," and thus 
dismissed the charges against Fullmer. This interpretation 
contradicts the plain meaning of the statute and the interpretation 
given to the statute by the Utah Supreme Court. It also creates a 
ridiculous exemption from the law if the individual can show that 
the weapon was concealed in a non-moving vehicle. Therefore, the 
ruling was in error, and it should be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
"Clearly, where the weapon is immediately and easily acces-
sible, the fair import of the law is that the individual is 
'carrying' the weapon." State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092, 1095 
(Utah 1981). The Utah Supreme Court could not have used plainer 
language to define "carrying" for the purposes of Section 76-10-
504. Movement of a vehicle has nothing to do with whether a weapon 
was "carried" or not. The relevant question is whether Fullmer had 
ready access to the weapon, not whether his automobile moved while 
it contained the weapon. 
The language of Section 76-10-501 states that a concealed 
dangerous weapon is one that is hidden but readily accessible for 
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immediate use. Movement in a vehicle is not critical. A weapon in 
a non-moving vehicle is still a concealed dangerous weapon, and the 
threat to the public from that weapon is as real as when the 
vehicle moves. However, the interpretation of the trial judge 
exempts people who conceal weapons in non-moving vehicles. This 
interpretation has no basis in the statute or in the decision of 
the Utah Supreme Court that defines the term "carrying." 
In State v. Williams the court found that the defendant 
"carried" a handgun by hiding it in his vehicle where he could 
easily access it. The only significant difference between Williams 
and the present case is that in Williams the vehicle had moved with 
the handgun, and in the present case the vehicle had not moved. 
Such a difference is immaterial to the question of whether the 
weapon was under Fullmer's control and readily accessible for 
immediate use. The trial judge impermissibly found that 
distinction material, and dismissed the charges simply because 
Fullmer's vehicle had not moved while it contained the weapon. 
That decision was in error, and it should be set aside 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court set aside the 
trial court's order dismissing the charges against Fullmer, and 
allow the case to be retried. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of April, 1996. 
ELLIOT R. LAWRENCE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-10-501 to -504. 
>7 CRIMINAL CODE 76-10-501 
nitrate, ammonium nitrate, fuel oil mixtures, cast 
primers and boosters, R.D.X., P.E.T.N., electric and 
nonelectric blasting caps, exploding cords commonly 
called detonating cord, detcord, or primacord, picric 
acid explosives, T.N.T. and T.N.T. mixtures, nitroglyc-
erin and nitroglycerin mixtures, or any other chemi-
cal mixture intended to explode with fire or force; 
(ii) any explosive bomb, grenade, missile, or simi-
lar device; and 
(iii) any incendiary bomb, grenade, fire bomb, 
chemical bomb, or similar device, including any de-
vice, except kerosene lamps, if criminal intent has not 
been established, which consists of or includes a 
breakable container including a flammable liquid or 
compound and a wick composed of any material 
which, when ignited, is capable of igniting the flam-
mable liquid or compound or any breakable container 
which consists of, or includes a chemical mixture that 
explodes with fire or force and can be carried, thrown, 
or placed. 
(b) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary device" shall not 
include rifle, pistol, or shotgun ammunition. 
(c) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts" means 
any substances or materials or combinations which have 
been prepared or altered for use in the creation of an 
explosive, chemical, or incendiary device. These sub-
stances or materials include: 
(i) timing device, clock, or watch which has been 
altered in such a manner as to be used as the arming 
device in an explosive; 
(ii) pipe, end caps, or metal tubing which has been 
prepared for a pipe bomb; and 
(iii) mechanical timers, mechanical triggers, 
chemical time delays, electronic time delays, or com-
mercially made or improvised items which, when 
used singly or in combination, may be used in the 
construction of a timing delay mechanism, booby 
trap, or activating mechanism for any explosive, 
chemical, or incendiary device. 
(d) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts" shall not 
include rifle, pistol, or shotgun ammunition, or any sig-
naling device customarily used in operation of railroad 
equipment. 
(2) The provisions in Subsections (3) and (6) shall not apply 
o: 
(a) any public safety officer while acting in his official 
capacity transporting or otherwise handling explosives, 
chemical, or incendiary devices; 
(b) any member of the armed forces of the United 
States or Utah National Guard while acting in his official 
capacity; 
(c) any person possessing a valid permit issued under 
the provisions of Uniform Fire Code, Article 77, or any 
employee of such permittee acting within the scope of his 
employment; 
(d) any person possessing a valid license as an im-
porter, wholesaler, or display operator under the provi-
sions of the Utah Fireworks Act, Sections 11-3-3.2 and 
11-3-3.5; and 
(e) any person or entity possessing or controlling an 
explosive, chemical, or incendiary device as part of its 
lawful business operations. 
(3) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly 
possesses or controls an explosive, chemical, or incendiary 
device is guilty of a felony of the second degree. 
(4) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly: 
(a) uses or causes to be used an explosive, chemical, or 
incendiary device in the commission of or an attempt to 
commit a felony; or 
(b) injures another or attempts to injure another in his 
person or property through the use of an explosive, 
chemical, or incendiary device, is guilty of a felony of the 
first degree. 
(5) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly 
removes or causes to be removed or carries away any explo-
sive, chemical, or incendiary device from the premises where 
said explosive, chemical, or incendiary device is kept by the 
lawful user, vendor, transporter, or manufacturer without the 
consent or direction of the lawful possessor is guilty of a felony 
of the second degree. 
(6) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly 
possesses any explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts is guilty 
of a felony of the third degree. 1993 
76-10-307. Delivery to common carrier, mailing, or 
placement on premises . 
Every person who delivers or causes to be delivered to any 
express or railway company or other common carrier, or to any 
person, any explosive, chemical, or incendiary device, knowing 
it to be the device, without informing the common carrier or 
person of its nature, sends it through the mail, or throws or 
places it on or about the premises or property of another or in 
any place where another may be injured thereby in his person 
or property, is guilty of a felony of the second degree. 1993 
76-10-308. Explosive, chemical , or incendiary device — 
Venue of prosecution for shipping. 
Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly de-
livers any explosive, chemical, or incendiary device to any 
person for transmission without the consent or direction of the 
lawful possessor may be prosecuted in the county in which he 
delivers it or in the county to which it is transmitted. 1993 
76-10-309. Repealed. 1993 
PART 4 
FENCES 
76-10-401. Fencing of shafts and wel ls . 
Any person who has sunk or shall sink a shaft or well on the 
public domain for any purpose shall inclose it with a substan-
tial curb or fence, which shall be at least four and one-half feet 
high. Any person violating the provisions of this section is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 1973 
PART 5 
WEAPONS 
76-10-501. Uniform law — Definitions. 
(1) (a) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a 
constitutionally protected right, the Legislature finds the 
need to provide uniform laws throughout the state. Ex-
cept as specifically provided by state law, a citizen of the 
United States or a lawfully admitted alien shall not be: 
(i) prohibited from owning, possessing, purchas-
ing, transporting, or keeping any firearm at his place 
of residence, property, business, or in any vehicle 
under his control; or 
(ii) required to have a permit or license to pur-
chase, own, possess, transport, or keep a firearm, 
(b) This part is uniformly applicable throughout this 
state and in all its political subdivisions and municipali-
ties. All authority to regulate firearms shall be reserved to 
the state except where the Legislature specifically del-
egates responsibility to local authorities. Unless specifi-
cally authorized by the Legislature by statute, a local 
authority may not enact or enforce any ordinance, regu-
lation, or rule pertaining to firearms. 
76-10-502 CRIMINAL CODE 258 
(2) As used in this part: 
(a) (i) "Concealed dangerous weapon" means a danger-
ous weapon that is covered, hidden, or secreted in a 
manner that the public would not be aware of its 
presence and is readily accessible for immediate use. 
(ii) A dangerous weapon shall not be considered a 
concealed dangerous weapon if it is a firearm which is 
unloaded and is securely encased. 
(b) "Crime of violence" means aggravated murder, mur-
der, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, 
burglary, housebreaking, extortion, or blackmail accom-
panied by threats of violence, assault with a dangerous 
weapon, assault with intent to commit any offense pun-
ishable by imprisonment for more than one year, arson 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, or an 
attempt to commit any of these offenses. 
(c) "Criminal history background check" means a crimi-
nal background check conducted by a licensed firearms 
dealer on every purchaser of a handgun through the 
division or the local law enforcement agency where the 
firearms dealer conducts business. 
(d) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the 
manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing 
death or serious bodily injury. The following factors shall 
be used in determining whether a knife, or any other item, 
object, or thing not commonly known as a dangerous 
weapon is a dangerous weapon: 
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing; 
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any; 
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or 
thing was used; and 
(iv) the other lawful purposes for which the instru-
ment, object, or thing may be used. 
(e) "Dealer" means every person who is licensed under 
crimes and criminal procedure, 18 U.S.C. 923 and en-
gaged in the business of selling, leasing, or otherwise 
transferring a handgun, whether the person is a retail or 
wholesale dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise. 
(f) "Division" means the Law Enforcement and Techni-
cal Services Division of the Department of Public Safety, 
created in Section 53-5-103. 
(g) "Firearm" means a pistol, revolver, shotgun, sawed-
off shotgun, rifle or sawed-off rifle, or any device that 
could be used as a dangerous weapon from which is 
expelled a projectile by action of an explosive. 
(h) "Fully automatic weapon" means any firearm which 
fires, is designed to fire, or can be readily restored to fire, 
automatically more than one shot without manual reload-
ing by a single function of the trigger. 
(i) "Firearms transaction record form" means a form 
created by the division to be completed by a person 
purchasing, selling, or transferring a handgun from a 
dealer in the state. 
(j) "Handgun" means a pistol, revolver, or other firearm 
of any description, loaded or unloaded, from which any 
shot, bullet, or other missile can be discharged, the length 
of which, not including any revolving, detachable, or 
magazine breech, does not exceed 12 inches. 
(k) "Prohibited area" means any place where it is 
unlawful to discharge a firearm. 
(1) "Readily accessible for immediate use" means that a 
firearm or other dangerous weapon is carried on the 
person or within such close proximity and in such a 
manner that it can be retrieved and used as readily as if 
carried on the person. 
(m) "Sawed-off shotgun" or "sawed-off rifle" means a 
shotgun having a barrel or barrels of fewer than 18 inches 
in length, or in the case of a rifle, having a barrel or 
barrels of fewer than 16 inches in length, or any danger-
ous weapon made from a rifle or shotgun by alteration, 
modification, or otherwise, if the weapon as modified has 
an overall length of fewer than 26 inches. 
(n) "Securely encased" means not readily accessible for 
immediate use, such as held in a gun rack, or in a closed 
case or container, whether or not locked, or in a trunk or 
other storage area of a motor vehicle, not including a glove 
box or console box. 1996 
76-10-502. When weapon deemed loaded. 
(1) For the purpose of this chapter, any pistol, revolver, 
shotgun, rifle, or other weapon described in this part shall be 
deemed to be loaded when there is an unexpended cartridge, 
shell, or projectile in the firing position. 
(2) Pistols and revolvers shall also be deemed to be loaded 
when an unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile is in a 
position whereby the manual operation of any mechanism 
once would cause the unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile 
to be fired. 
(3) A muzzle loading firearm shall be deemed to be loaded 
when it is capped or primed and has a powder charge and ball 
or shot in the barrel or cylinders. 1990 
76-10-503. Purchase or possess ion of dangerous 
weapon/handgun — Persons not permitted to 
have — Penalties. 
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of 
violence under the laws of the United States, this state, or 
any other state, government, or country, or who is ad-
dicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has been 
declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in 
his possession or under his custody or control any danger-
ous weapon as defined in this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a 
firearm or sawed-off shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony 
may not have in his possession or under his custody or 
control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of 
a third degree felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a 
firearm, explosive, or incendiary device he is guilty of a 
second degree felony. 
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any 
handgun described in this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under 
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other 
state; 
(ii) is under indictment; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance 
as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Sec-
tion 58-37-2; 
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as 
provided in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159,107 Stat. 1536 (1993), or has 
been committed to a mental institution; 
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the 
United States; 
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces 
under dishonorable conditions; or 
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the 
United States, has renounced such citizenship. 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (3) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. IW* 
76-10-504. Carrying concealed dangerous weapon . 
(1) Except as provided in Section 76-10-503 and in Subsec-
tions (2) and (3): 
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(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous weapon 
which is not a firearm on his person or one that is readily 
accessible for immediate use which is not securely en-
cased, as defined in this part, in a place other than his 
residence, property, or business under his control is guilty 
of a class B misdemeanor 
(b) a person without a valid concealed firearm permit 
who carries a concealed dangerous weapon which is a 
firearm and tha t contains no ammunition is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains ammu-
nition the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
(2) A person who carries concealed a sawed-off shotgun or a 
sawed-off rifle is guilty of a second degree felony 
(3) If the concealed firearm is used in the commission of a 
crime of violence as defined in Section 76-10-501, and the 
person is a party to the offense, the person is guilty of a second 
degree felony 
(4) Nothing in Subsection (1) shall prohibit a person en 
gaged in the lawful taking of protected or unprotected wildlife 
as defined in Title 23 from carrying a concealed weapon or a 
concealed firearm with a barrel length of four inches or greater 
as long as the taking of wildlife does not occur 
(a) within the limits of a municipality in violation of 
that municipality's ordinances, or 
(b) upon the highways of the state as defined in Section 
41 6 1 1995 
76-10-505 C a r r y i n g l o a d e d firearm in vehic le , on 
s t r ee t , o r in p r o h i b i t e d a r e a . 
(1) Unless otherwise authorized by law, a person may not 
carry a loaded firearm 
(a) in or on a vehicle, 
(b) on any public street, or 
(c) in a posted prohibited area 
(2) A violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor 
1990 
76-10-505.5. P o s s e s s i o n of a d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n , fire-
a r m , o r sawed-off s h o t g u n on or a b o u t school 
p r e m i s e s — Pena l ty . 
(1) A person may not possess any dangerous weapon, fire 
arm, or sawed-off shotgun at a place that the person knows, or 
has reasonable cause to believe, is on or about school premises 
(2) (a) Possession of a dangerous weapon on or about school 
premises is a class B misdemeanor 
(b) Possession of a firearm or sawed off shotgun on or 
about school premises is a class A misdemeanor 
(3) This section applies to any person, except persons au 
thonzed to possess a firearm as provided under Sections 
53 5 704, 53 5 705, 53A 3 502, 76 10 510, 76 10 511, 76 10 
523, and Subsection 76 10 504(2) and as otherwise authorized 
by law 
(4) This section does not prohibit prosecution of a more 
serious weapons offense that may occur on or about school 
premises 1993 
76-10-506. T h r e a t e n i n g w i t h o r u s i n g d a n g e r o u s 
w e a p o n in fight o r q u a r r e l . 
Every person, except those persons described in Section 
76 10 503, who, not in necessary self defense in the presence 
of two or more persons, draws or exhibits any dangerous 
weapon in an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully 
uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor 1992 
76-10-507. Pos se s s ion of d e a d l y w e a p o n wi th i n t e n t to 
a s s a u l t . 
Every person having upon his person any dangerous 
weapon with intent to unlawfully assault another is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor 1973 
76-10-508. Discharge of firearm from a vehic le , near 
highway, o r in direction of any person, build-
ing, o r veh ic le . 
(1) (a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous 
weapon or firearm 
(1) from an automobile or other vehicle, 
(u) from, upon, or across any highway, 
(111) at any road signs placed upon any highways of 
the state, 
(IV) at any communications equipment or property 
of public utilities including facilities, lines, poles, or 
devices of transmission or distribution, 
(v) at railroad equipment or facilities including 
any sign or signal, 
(vi) within Utah State Park buildings, designated 
camp or picnic sites, overlooks, golf courses, boat 
ramps, and developed beaches, or 
(vn) without written permission to discharge the 
dangerous weapon from the owner or person in 
charge of the property withm 600 feet of 
(A) a house, dwelling, or any other building, or 
(B) any structure in which a domestic animal 
is kept or fed, including a barn, poultry yard, 
corral, feeding pen, or stockyard 
(b) It shall be a defense to any charge for violating this 
section that the person being accused had actual permis 
sion of the owner or person in charge of the property at the 
time in question 
(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a class B 
misdemeanor unless the actor discharges a firearm under any 
of the following circumstances not amounting to criminal 
homicide or attempted criminal homicide, in which case it is a 
third degree felony 
(a) the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of 
any person or persons, knowing or having reason to 
believe that any person may be endangered, 
(b) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass an 
other or with intent to damage a habitable structure as 
defined in Subsection 76-6-101(2), discharges a firearm in 
the direction of any building, or 
(c) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass an 
other, discharges a firearm in the direction of any vehicle 
(3) This section does not apply to a person 
(a) who discharges any kind of firearm when- that 
person is in lawful defense of self or others, or 
(b) who is performing official duties as provided in 
Sections 23 20-1 5 and 76-10-523 and as otherwise pro 
vided by law 1995 
76-10-509 Possess ion of d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n by minor . 
(1) A minor under 18 years of age may not possess a 
dangerous weapon unless he 
(a) has the permission of his parent or guardian to have 
the weapon, or 
(b) is accompanied by a parent or guardian while he 
has the weapon in his possession 
(2) Any minor under 14 years of age in possession of a 
dangerous weapon shall be accompanied by a responsible 
adult 
(3) Any person who violates this section is guilty of 
(a) a class B misdemeanor upon the first offense, and 
(b) a class A misdemeanor for each subsequent offense 
1993 (2nd S S ) 
76-10-509 4. P r o h i b i t i o n of possess ion of c e r t a i n w e a p -
ons by m i n o r s . 
(1) A minor under 18 years of age may not possess a 
handgun 
(2) Except as provided by federal law, a minor under 18 
years of age may not possess the following 
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 16th day of October, 
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the HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE COURT: Ifm going to find that the 
4 weapon does in fact meet the requirements of 76-10-
5 501(2)(d), dangerous weapon. Defines it as any item that in 
6 its manner of its use or intended use, clearly it is 
7 intended to fire projectiles from there, whether or not it 
8 is capable because of a malfunction exceeds the definition, 
9 The definition talks in terms of its intended use; but 76-
10 10-504(1)(b) is a person without a valid concealed firearm 
11 permit who carries a concealed dangerous weapon. 
12 In this case the testimony that certainly has 
13 credible—credibility problems, but the only testimony is 
14 that the weapon was placed in the vehicle, it had not been 
15 moved in the vehicle. If the vehicle had been stopped while 
16 it was traveling, anything in the vehicle that's within 
17 certainly arm's length, readily accessible under 501(2)(L) 
18 could be said to be carried. Says carried on the person or 
19 is in such close proximity. 
20 MS. O'BRIEN: Your Honor, can I 
21 interject something? 
22 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
23 MS. O'BRIEN: It's my understanding 
24 under State v. Williams that they did discuss in their 
25 "carrying", the meaning of "carrying" under the section and 
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1 it did not require--
2 THE COURT: Okay. And the State vs. 
3 Williams, though, is a vehicle that's moving as opposed to 
4 one that's stationary. If this had been moving, clearly 
5 carrying extends to a vehicle that's moving; but if it's not 
6 moving, then it's not any different than placing it in a 
7 room some place, 
8 MS. O'BRIEN: But any time an officer 
9 stops a vehicle, the vehicle's not going to be moving. 
10 THE COURT: No, but they have seen the 
11 vehicle move. In this case, the vehicle wasn't moving and 
12 had not been moving with the weapon in that location, so I'm 
13 going to find that it doesn't meet the definition as 
14 carried. 
15 If they had pulled the car over and found the 
16 weapon there, clearly he was carrying the weapon in close 
17 proximity; but the vehicle had not been moved. The 
18 testimony, such as it is, was that it was carried out of the 
19 apartment and placed on the seat. 
20 If he had encased it and put it away before the 
21 vehicle moved, he wouldn't be carrying it. But the vehicle 
22 wasn't moving and it falls through the cracks. I'm going to 
23 find him not guilty. 
24 MR. FULLMER: Thank you, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: The City can certainly 
I 3^  
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
* * * 
1 appeal since it is a ruling based on a matter of law.. If you 
2 want to appeal it, Ms. O'Brien, I'll require that the weapon 
3 be held pending the appeal. 
4 MS. O'BRIEN: Okay. 
5 THE COURT: Do you want to at least 
6 consider that option? 
7 MS. O'BRIEN: I do, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. The weapon w i l l be 
9 held during the duration of the appeal t ime. 
10 (Whereupon, t h i s hearing was concluded.) 
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